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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the relationship between the newmonetary control
procedures, implemented by the Federal Reserve Board in October l979, and
the subsequent increase in exchange rate variability for the United States.
It shows that, in the context of a stochastic, rational expectationsmodel,
exchan.ge rate variability minimizing monetary policy is identical to the
policy which, in a deterministic, perfect foresight model, would place the
economy on the borderline between exchange rate overshooting and undershoot—
ing. The model is estimated for the United States since generalized
floating began in 1973. The new monetary control procedures have had two
opposite effects. Monetary policy has become less acconodative, increasing
exchange rate variability through overshooting. On the other hand,
systematic deviations from uncovered interest rate parity, which can be
attributed to exchange risk, have also increased. These increase exchange
rate variability through undershooting. It is shown that the latter dominate
theformer, providing an explanation of increased exchange rate variability






The new monetary control procedures, implemented by the Federal
Reserve Board in October 1979, have been the subject of extensive
scrutiny. One major item of interest has been the impact of these
procedures on financial markets in general and, in particular, on the
foreign exchange market. A focus of this interest has been on exchange
rate variability which, like the variability of other financial assets,
has increased substantially since 19791.
This paper considers the relationship between the conduct of
monetary policy and the variability of exchange rates2. It shows
that, in the context of a stochastic, rational expectations model,
exchange rate variability minimizing monetary policy is identical to the
policy which, in a deterministic, perfect foresight model, would place
the economy on the borderline between exchange rate overshooting and
undershooting. Policy which would cause either overshooting or
undershooting would increase variability.
In this context, the change in the conduct of monetary policy in
the United States can be expected to have two opposite effects.
Monetary policy which is less acconinodative of prices and/or interest
rates, "monetarist" monetary policy, can affect exchange rate
variability through overshooting. On the other hand, the change in the
conduct of monetary policy was accompanied by a good deal of uncertainty
regarding the exact nature of the new policy. It is shown below how
this increase in uncertainty, or increase in exchange risk, will
increase deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in a predictable
manner. These deviations, in turn, can affect exchange rate variability
through undershooting.
1Using constrained maximum likelihood methods, the model is
estimated for the United States since generalized floating began in
1973. The estimation procedures incorporate both the rational
expectations restrictions and the policy rules. Over the period 1973—79,
the dollar experienced slight undershooting. Over the full period,
1973-82, the effects of less accommodative monetary policy were
overwhelmed by those of the increase in exchange risk, causing exchange
rate undershooting. The explanation of increased exchange rate variability
as being caused by undershooting, as opposed to overshooting: is
confirmed by estimating a less constrained version of the model within
which the undershooting hypothesis can be directly tested.
The model is presented in Section II. In Section III, it is shown
how variable output, risk aversion, and accommodative monetary policy
affect exchange rate variability. The model is estimated in Section IV
and conclusions are presented in Section V.
2II. The Model
The model is based on Dornbusch (1976), although it extends his
work in a number of directions. It is a two-country model,
incorporating variable output, deviations from uncovered interest rate
parity, and both domestic and foreign money supply reaction functions.
The two country specification, rather than a single, small country
specification, was chosen to avoid making exogeneity assumptions
regarding foreign prices and interest rates which cannot be supported
empirically and to allow for the foreign money supply, as well as the
domestic money supply, to be determined endogenously. This is shown
below to be quite important, both theoretically and empirically, in
determining the magnitude of exchange rate variability. In order to
provide clear theoretical results that could be tested empirically, a
number of simplifying assumptions were made so that the model could be
solved analytically. The model consists 0f the following equations:
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wherem is the logarithm of the domestic money supply,
y is the logarithm of domesticreal output,
iis the domestic nominal interest rate,
r is the domestic real interest rate,
e is the logarithmof the exchange rate (domestic currency
priceof foreign exchange),
* associatedwith a variable indicates that it refers to the
foreign country,
q is the logarithm of the ratio ofdomestic to foreign prices,
i.e., =- p,where p is the logarithm of the
domestic price level,
"overa variable indicates deviation from the steadystate
-level,
y0 is the exogenous componentof output,
in0isthe exogenous component of the money supply,
is the expectation of the exchange rate for period t+l,
conditional on information available in period t,
the e's are random variables, which may be serially correlated.
4The money and output market equilibrium conditions are standard.
The supply of and demand for real balances are equated in equilibrium
for each country, with the demand for real balances depending positively
on income and negatively on the interest rate3.
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Equation (1) is obtained by subtracting (ib) from Cia) and by setting
= - Realoutput in each country is demand determined,
with output demand depending positively on the real exchange rate, (the
relative price of foreign to domestic goods), and negatively on the real
interest rate. An exogenous term and a stochastic disturbance term are
also included. While deviations from purchasing power parity are
allowed in the short run, it is assumed that long run purchasing power
parity hold (=









- Keeping the two-country model tractable
requires equating the income elasticity of the demand for money (a1),
the interest rate semi-elasticity of the demand for money (a2), and the
real interest rate semi-elasticity of output (a4) in the two
countries.
The rate of inflation in each country, as in Dornbusch (1976), is
assumed to depend on excess demand in the goods market,




where'= y0-a4and 5*= y-a4*are the steady state levels of
5output. The steady state real interest rates,and areequal
because, in long run equilibrium, there can be no depreciation or
inflation. Substituting (2a) into (3a) and (2b) into (3b), and








Notethat both domestic and foreign prices are pre-determined.5
If capital were perfectly mobile and economic agents risk neutral,
uncovered interest rate parity would require that the interest rate
differentialequal the expected rate of depreciation.
-= et+i - et
Recent empirical work by Cumby and Obstfeld (1983) and Hansen and
Hodrick (1983) provides evidence that this relationship does not hold
for most bilateral exchange rates, even when there do not appear to be
constraints on the mobility of capital between the countries involved.
In particular, the evidence suggests that risk premia are significant
and vary over time. For the United States' effectiveexchange rate, an
additionalconsideration is that, while capital may be perfectly mobile
with regard to the U.S., the weighted average of countries that
comprisesthe foreign "country" includes some, such as Japan, that
clearly restricted capital flows over at least part of the sample period.
Muchof the theoretical work on the determinants of the risk
premium involves considerations of portfolio balance, such as relative
suppliesof wealth, that are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
we use some of the concepts in Dornbusch's (1983) mean-variancemodel of
international portfolio choice to relate deviations from uncovered
interest rate parity to deviations from purchasing power parity.
6We begin by formaliziRg the relationship between real interest
rates in the two countries and the structure of expected real asset
returns faced by investors in either country. By the Fisher relation
with pre-determined prices, either country's real interest rateequals
its nominal interest rate minus its expected, (equal to actual),rate of
inflation,6
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implying the following real interest rate differential:
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Assumingthat covered interest parity, where the (nominal) interest
rate differential equals the forward premium, holds at all times
produces the following expression for the real interest rate
differential,
(4b) r -r*=f - e- - t t t t
't+l
where is the one period forward exchange rate. For the moment,
assume that capital is perfectly mobile, so that risk neutrality implies
uncovered interest rate parity. In that case, (which we do not
generally assume to hold), the real interest rate differential equals the
expected real rate of depreciation,
(4c) r - = (et+1-et)
-t+l
From the perspective of a domestic investor, the real returnon a
domestic asset (Rt) is just the domestic real interest rate. Hisor
her expected real return, (in terms of purchasingpower over domestic
goods), on a foreign asset (R) is the foreign interest rate plus the
expected rate of depreciation minus the domestic inflation rate,
=.* + ( \ ( — tt t+l t''t+lvt''
7which is not the foreign real interest rate. The domestic investor's
real return differential is
R .R*=i _j*(e -e) t t t t t+l t
Adding and subtracting the inflation differential, we obtain the
relation between the real return differential and the real interest rate
differential,
(4d) Rt R =(rtr*t) -((et+i
-et)
Under uncovered interest rate parity, since the real interest rate
differential equals the expected real rate of depreciation, real returns
are equalized,
(4e) Rt -= 0.
Under covered interest rate parity, substituting (4b) into (4d) produces
the result that the real return differential equals the risk premium,
(4f) Rt
=
Thechoices faced by a foreign investor can be similarly described. The
foreign investor's real return on a foreign asset (F*) is the foreign
real interest rate, His or her real return on a domestic asset (F) is
the domestic interest rate minus the expected rate of depreciation minus
the foreign inflation rate. The foreign investors real return
differential is the same as that faced by the domestic investor,
-F*=i i* (e e ) t t t t t+l t'
The assumption of long run purchasing power parity in a linear, rational
expectations model ensures that an overvalued exchange rate (et >
impliesexpected real appreciation while an undervalued rate (et <
impliesexpected real depreciation. This can be seen by considering
all possible monotonic adjustment paths toward the steady state
(= ) equilibrium.It should be noted that this statement contains
8no implications about the expected (or actual) movement of the nominal
exchange rate.
Consider the case wheree > Withrisk neutrality, real
returns are equalized. Since there is expected real appreciation,
equation (4d) requires that the real interest rate differential be
negative, i.e., that >r.Now consider risk aversion. Since
nominal interest rates are known and price levels are pre-deterniined,
the only source of risk is exchange rate risk. From the perspective of
a domestic investor, since foreign assets are riskier, the real return
on foreign assets must exceed the real return on domestic assets
(R >R)to induce investment in foreign assets. From the
perspective of a foreign investor, domestic assets are riskier, and it is
necessary for Ft > F to induce investment in them.These two
conditions cannot occur simultaneously. With the world consisting of
two countries, if one is a net lender the other must be a net borrower.
Assuming that the real interest rate is the marginal product of capital,
and assuming away all other considerations, such as differences in
tastes, size, wealth, liquidity characteristics, and risk aversion, that
could influence borrowing and lending, the country with the higher real
rate of interest will borrow and the other will lend. In this case,
since r >r,R > Rt to induce domestic residents to invest in
foreign assets. From equation (4f), R >Rtimplies that e+i >
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9To produce equation (4), a stochastic disturbance term is added to (4g)
to capture factors that may cause deviations from uncovered interest
rate parity but are not included in the model.
Now consider the case where e < implying expected real
depreciation. With risk neutrality, real return equalization (in 4d)
requires that r > rt. This implies that the domestic country will
borrow abroad and, with risk aversion, that Ft > Ft to induce foreign
investors to invest in the domestic asset. Since Ft —Ft
=
Rt
equation (4f) requires that > e1. Using covered interest
rate parity, i =(et+i
-et)
+z.Since et <
(4h) - = - et)-
a7(et
-
whichis both equations (4g) and (4).
Equation (4) relates deviations form uncovered interest rate parity
to deviations from purchasing power parity in a systematic manner. The
parameter a7 represents both the degree of risk aversion on the part
of investors and the degree of risk in the market. With risk
neutrality, a7 =0.The more risk averse are investors, the larger is
a7. If there is no exchange risk, a7=0.The greater the exchange
risk, the larger is a7.
The equation was derived, using risk aversion, assuming perfect
capital mobility. An identical equation is derived, using a flow
capital mobility specification, in Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982) and
Papell (1983). In those models, the current account balance is
postulated to depend on relative prices and the (flow) capital account
to depend on the expectations adjusted interest rate differential.
Using the constraint that, in the absence of central bank intervention,
the current and capital accounts sum to zero, equation (4) is derived,
10The parametera7 represents the degree of capital mobility, with
a7 =0being perfect mobility.
While these models are observationally equivalent fromany single
country at a point in time, they have the potential to be differentiated
either by estimating a cross-section of countriesor by estimating one
country over different tine periods. In this case, the hypothesis tobe
tested is that the change in the Fed'soperating procedure increased
uncertainty in financial markets, including the market forforeign
exchange. This increase in foreign exchange risk increased therequired
expected real return differential for investing abroad, which would
increase a7. The alternative explanation fora rise in a7, a
decrease in the mobility of capital since 1979, does notseem tenable.
Thus testing the model over these two periods for theUnited States
provides the potential for differentiating between them.
The money supply for each country dependson the exchange rate, the
difference between domestic and foreign prices, and thenominal interest
rate differential. Monetery policy for eithercountry is accommodative
if that country's money supply increases when itsexchange rate
depreciates, when the difference between its prices and the other
country's prices increases and/or when its nominal interest rate
differential increases. Thus positive coefficients for
a3a13 are
accommodative, negative coefficients are offsetting. Themoney supply
is constrained to respond to the price ratio, rather than tothe levels
separately, because, in the reduced form of the model, pricesappear
only in ratio form. While allowing the money supplies torespond
separately to domestic and foreign price levels would be desirable, it
would make the model analytically intractible. A number ofanalysts
11have proposed that the money supply be decreased when the rei exchange
rate depreciates and increased when it appreciates. This would involve
offsetting the exchange rate and acconiiiodating the price ratio so that
a8 =- aand a11 =- a12.The money supply rule for each
country also includes an exogenous term and a stochastic disturbance
term.
12III. Exchange Rate Variability
In this section, we solve the model and show how variable output,
risk aversion7, and accommodative monetary policy affect exchange rate
variability.We then describe the relationship between variability and
the concepts of overshooting and undershooting.
Before solving the model, it is useful to simplify the price
adjustment, output, and money supply equations. Substituting (4a) and
(4) into (3), and collecting terms, we obtain,

















































It can be seen from (9) that the degree of a risk aversion affects the
use of interest rate targets for the conduct of monetary policy. If the
money supply accommodates the interest rate differential, (a10, a13 >0),
then monetary policy becomes more offsetting towards the exchange rate
but more accommodative towards prices. The magnitude of these effects
depends on the degree of risk aversion. If investors were risk neutral
(a7 =0),interest rate targeting would not affect the degree of
accommodation.
13Substituting (4), (8), and (9) into (1), and interpreting all









We solve the model by using the method of undetermined coefficients.
Assuming that expectations are determined rationally and that e and
follow stationary stochastic processes, infinite order moving
average representations of e and can be written,
(11)
e =i0111i lti +i0112i-1 2ti
q =0. U.+. 0. U t1=1 li—iit—i1=12i—i2t—i'
where the different representations for e and reflect the
assumption that prices are pre-deterrnined. Solution of the model
requires substituting (11) into (10) and solving the resultant set of
identities. As is usual in rational expectations models with
expectations of future values of variables, the solution is not unique
without the usual assumption that the conditionally expected exchange
rate and price paths are stable. In addition, we need to assume that
the money supply either offsets or is not too accommodative of exchange
rate movements, so that > 1, in order to guarantee that the
stability assumption will produce a unique solution. Assuming that the
14disturbances are serially uncorrelated8, the solution of the model is as
follows,
(12)
e =B1Pt + u1 + 20 u2,
=l t-l +610 U11 + 020 U2tp
where A1 is the stable (< 1) characteristic root,
B1 =52(A1










Exchange rate variability can be characterized either by the
asymptotic or the conditional variance of the exchange rate around its
steady state level.9 The asymptotic variance of the exchange rate is
=Bs
+ Ir0s1 + This is the appropriate measure if we
want to look at data ex post, such as to compare variability over
different time periods. The conditional variance of the exchange rate
is =
Bcy.
This is the appropriate measure to evaluate
policy in the absence of information on the distribution of future
disturbances. The conditional variance of the exchange rate is zero,
and the asymptotic variance minimized, if B1 =0.10This can only
occur if 2 =0.The sign of 2 is determined by the income (a1)
elasticity and the interest rate (a2) semi—elasticity of the demand
for money, the elasticity of the demand for output with respect to the
real exchange rate (d3), the degree of risk aversion on the part of
investors (a7), and the degree of accommodation of domestic (c2)
and foreign (c4) money supplies to price movements. It should be
stressed that output variability, risk aversion, and accommodative
monetary policy all decrease 62.
15The intuition behind these results is provided by examining the
relationship between exchange rate variability and overshooting. In
response to a permanent, unanticipated increase in (for example) the
money supply, which causes a proportionate long run depreciation of the
exchange rate, overshooting occurs if the exchange rate first
depreciates by more than its long run value, and then appreciates over
time back to the steady state. Undershooting occurs if the exchange
rate first depreciates by less than its long run value, and then
continues to depreciate until the steady state is attained. In Papeil
(1983b), it is shown that in the perfect foresight version of the flow
capital mobility version of this model, 62 =0is the borderline case
between overshooting and undershooting. Overshooting occurs when
62 > 0, undershooting when 62 < 0.It is important to remember that,
at any instant of time, prices are pre-determined while the exchange
rate is free to jump. When 62 =0,the exchange rate immediately
jumps to its new long run equilibrium value. This corresponds, in the
present stochastic context, to zero conditional and minimum asymptotic
exchange rate variability.
The overshooting hypothesis was motivated as an explanation for
high exchange rate variability. Our results show that there is not a
one—to-one relation between variability and overshooting. High exchange
rate variability can be produced by undershooting as well as
overshooting. Furthermore, changes in the structural and policy
parameter which decrease ó2 (and hence reduce overshooting), only
will be certain to decrease variability if the country begins at a
position of overshooting and does not move into undershooting.
Otherwise, variability may actually be increased. For example, consider
16a country that is characterized by overshooting. By making monetary
policy more accommodative of prices, (either directly or through
accommodating interest rates), exchange rate variability can be reduced.
If monetary policy becomes too accommodative, undershooting will result
and variability increased.
17IV. EmpiricalResults
We now examine the effects of the changes in the conduct of
monetary policy in the United States since October1979.In order to
accomplish this, using quarterly data, we estimate themodel separately
for the periods 1973 (II) —1979(III) and 1973 (II) —1982(III), and
then compare the results. The model is estimated by constrainedmaximum
likelihood techniques, with the constraints on the parameters caused by
the form of the structural equations, assumption of rational
expectations, and the stability condition necessary toachieve a unique
solution. The structural (a1 -a7)and policy (a8a13)
coefficients are jointly estimated. Combined with the impositionof
rational expectations, this satisfies several aspects of Lucas (1976)
critique of econometric policy evaluation.
Estimation of the model first requires deriving the reduced form.
Substituting the expression for e from (10) into (4), (8),and








-1a7)et + 2 + a7)q +
4= (d3-d4(1 l))et -(d3+ 2d4)q + U
m a8e + a9q+ a10(it i) + u5.
* ! a11e a12q — a13i1' U6.
theu'sare combinations of Ult, u2., and the c's.
it is necessary to make some assumptions about the structure ofthe
error terms. We assume that they are generated by firstorder
autoregressive processes, i.e.,
= + jt' j =1,...,6,
where the tb's are serially uricorrelated. We then take the infinite
moving average representation implicit in the above autoregressive
18process and truncate it at third order for u1 and fourth order for the
others. This produces a first order autoregressive fourth ordermoving
average model. Assuming that expectations are determined rationally and






where z. =+land A and B are 2 x 2matrices.The elements of A and B
are non—linear combinations of the S's, y's, and ct's. The v's are
combinations of the f's, written so as to make the zero lag coefficient
matrix the identity matrix.11 The model to be estimated consists of
equations (13) -(17).Maximum likelihood estimates (conditional on the
initial disturbances being set equal to zero) are obtained under the
assumption that (v1 v2. u3. u4u u6t)' is multivariate normal. The
Davidon-Fletcher-powell algorithm is used to find the optimum.
As described above, the model is estimated for the United States,
beginning with the advent of generalized floating in 1973 (II) and
ending either in 1979 (III), before the change in the Fed's operating
procedure, or in 1982(111). While it would have been preferable to
estimate the model over non-overlapping sub—periods, this was precluded
by the limited number of quarterly observations since 1979. We
considered using monthly data, but it did not seem sensible to estimate
monthly money demand, output demand, and money supply equations without
incorporating lags. Unfortunately, incorporating lags was precluded by
our desire to keep the model analytically representable. Our results
should therefore be interpreted with caution, remembering that, if the
datawereavailable, the model would be estimated separately for the
period since 1979 (III).
19We use the effective exchange rate (MERM) calculated by the
International Monetary Fund. Real GNP (or GDP) is used to measure
output, MI for the money supply, the GNP deflator for the price level,
and representative three month money market rates for the interest rate.
The foreign variables were constructed by taking weighted averages, with
the weights taken from those used to construct the MERM rates. In order
to achieve stationarity, all variables, after taking logarithms (except
for the interest rate), were detrended by regression on a constant and a
linear time trend.1
We use a two-step method of estimation. First, we estimate the
money market equilibrium equation (I) by a single equation method, and
then use the estimates from the regression as constants for the
constrained maximum likelihood estimates13. •There are several
advantages to this procedure, First, it enables us to get estimates of
the income elasticity and the interest rate semi-elasticity of the
demand for money directly from data on income and interest rates.
Second, the unstable nature of money demand estimates during the 1970's
raises the possibility that these parameters are inconsistently
estimated. In that case, estimating them by maximum likelihood would
spread inconsistency throughout the model. Finally, it reduces the
number of parameters to be estimated by maximum likelihood. The
disadvantages of the procedure are twofold. First, if the inconsistency
in the money demand estimates is caused by the use of single equation
methods this may introduce inconsistency into the model. Second,
because for the maximum likelihood procedure it is assumed that a1 and
a2 are estimated without error, the standard errorsof the other
variables will be biased downward.'4
20The maximum likelihood estimates of the structural (a3 —a7),
policy (a8 -a13)and, serial correlation (a1 -a6)parameters are given
inTable 1along with their asymptoticat-ratios", the ratio of the
coefficients to their standard errors computed from the inverse of the
second derivative matrix of the likelihood function. Single equation
estimatesfor a1 and a2, as well as parameter values for the reduced
form coefficients implied by the estimates, are also presented.
The central result of the estimates is that 62 is close to zero
(-.09)during 1973-79 and negative (-2.58) during 1973-82, indicating
thatthe observed increase in exchange rate variability was caused, not
by overshooting, but by undershooting. The principal reason for this
was the dramatic change in the risk parameter (a7), which increased
from.56to 3.17, With the decrease in the interest rate
semi-elasticityof the demand for money being comparatively small,
a2a7 increased from .39 to 1.90, causingmuch of the decline in
62. By way of illustration, if a7 stayed at .57 while all the other
parameterstook on their 1973—82 estimates, the value of 62would be
.07.Another important determinant in the change in 62 is the decrease
in the real interest rate semi-elasticity of output demand (a4), which
bycausing d4 to decrease, increases 62 (in absolute value) by
decreasing its denominator. With 62 close to zero, (as in the 1973-79
estimates) B1 will be close to zero whatever the values of i (the
stable root) and 61. With 62 not close to zero, (as in 1973—82),
the values of and matter. Changes in between the two
periods were small. The value of 61 increased during 1973—82, making
(A1 - lessnegative. This affect, however, was swamped by the
increase (in absolute value) of 62, causing B1 to increase from
.08 to .71 between the periods.
21We now examine the changes in the money supply reaction functions.
For the United States, looking directly at the structural parameter, the
money supply because more accommodative of prices, (a9 increased from
1,43 to 1.79), but more offsetting of interest rates, (a10 decreases
from -.94 to -1.14). However, when one includes the offsetting of
prices implicit in offsetting interest rates with a positive risk
parameter, (c2a9 +a7a10),domestic monetary policy (c,j switched
from being quite accommodative (.90) to very offsetting (-1.82). With
foreign monetary policy, in contrast, the direct and combination results
coincide. There is a decrease in the amount that foreign monetary
policy offsets prices, (a12 changes from -1.19 to —.81), and a switch
from offsetting to accommodating interest rates, (a13 increases from
—.61 to .19). Including the impact of the risk parameter, foreign
monetary policy becomes less offsetting of prices; c4 increases from
-1.56 to -.21. The switch from accommodative to offsetting monetary
policy in the United States dominates the decrease in offsetting abroad;
+
c4
decreases from -.66 to -2.03. Taken in isolation, this would
have caused exchange rate overshooting. The increase in the risk
parameter, however, dominates the increase in offsetting monetary policy
to cause undershooting.
Since 2 is not estimated directly, but is implied by the values
of the estimated coefficients, it is legitimate to ask how significant
is the undershooting result for the 1973—82 estimates. In order to
answer that question, a semi-constrained° version of the model was
estimated. In this version, and 62 are estimated directly,
rather than being implied by the structural and policy coefficients. All
of the other coefficients of the model are estimated as in the
constrained version above, This enables us to test for undershooting
22directly by examining the sign and significance level of 66. The
results of this procedure support the results found above, with
62 =-.26(-.36) for 1973-82 and -2.18 (-2.65) for 1973-82, (asymptotic
"t—ratios" are in parentheses). This indicates not only that the
undershooting result is not simply a construct of the structural and
policy parameters but also that it is significant'5.
Another possibility which we consider is that the deviations form
uncovered interest rate parity in the 1973-82 estimates were caused by
the imposition of credit controls in 1980. Interest rates in the United
States, (and the interest rate differential), were very high in 1980 (I).
With the credit controls, they fell dramatically in 1980 (II) and (III),
but returned to almost their original levels in 1980 (IV). In order to
test whether the increase in the estimated value of a7 was caused by the
controls, we replaced the actual values of the interest rate
differential in 1980 (II) and (III) with values that were calculated by
taking the figure for 1980 (I) and (IV) and interpolating. We then
estimated the model for 1973-82, and found that a7 was 2.76 (2.61).
This indicates that most of the increase in a7 was not caused by the
imposition of credit controls. Using the same data, we estimated the
semi—constrained version of the model, and found that 62 equaled —2.44
(-9.54). Thus the undershooting results are not affected by correcting
for credit controls.
We have characterized the changes in exchange rate variability
strictly in terms of changes in B1 which, while appropriate for
conditional variability, is not necessarily appropriate for asymptotic
variability. In order to consider asymptotic variability, we have to
examine the parameters of the price adjustment equation (y and
23Note that both parameters change very little over the periods and that
is quite small (.04), indicating that we can approximately
characterize asymptotic variability in terms of and Thus the
above analysis of conditional variability also applies to asymptotic
variability.
We conclude by evaluating the success of the estimates. The
positive result is that the individual parameter estimates are very
successful. All of the estimates, (except for the relative price
elasticity of output demand), are of the "correct sign. For 1973-82,
most of the parameters are significant; for 1973—79, the results are
mixed. It is especially noteworthy that the risk parameter, upon which
much of the analysis rests, is small and insignificant for 1973—79 and
large and significant for 1973—82. In addition, the correlations
between the actual and predicted values of the variable are fairly
high.16 The negative result is provided by the likelihood ratio test.
Comparing the constrained version of the model to anI!unconstraifledtl
version, which imposes the same policy equations (15-16) and serial
correlation structure as the constrained version described above, but
does not impose the forms of the structural equations or the rational
expectations restrictions, we can reject the constrainedmodel at
standard significance levels for both periods17. This accords with
the results of previous work involving the United States since 1973,
including Driskill and Scheffrin (1981), Glaessner (1982), and Papell
(1983b)18.
24V. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the changes
in the conduct of monetary policy in the United States following the new
monetary control procedures in October 1979 and the increase in exchange
rate variability experienced since then. We find two major effects,
although the estimation procedures necessatated by the small number of
observations since 1979 suggest that our results be interpreted with
caution. American monetary policy has become substantially less
accommodative and there has been a significant increase in the risk
parameter measuring systematic deviations from uncovered interest rate
parity. Our estimation results indicate that the latter dominates the
former, providing an explanation of increased exchange rate variability
consistent with exchange rate undershooting. This is in contrast with
the generally accepted association between high variability and
overshooting.
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28Footnotes
Levich (1981) and Truman and others (1981) provide evidence on the
increase in exchange rate variability in the first year following
the new monetary control procedures.
2 Truman (1981) and Black (1982) also consider this issue, but in the
context of quite different models from this paper.
3 Deflating the money supply in each country by a price index
composed of a weighted average of domestically produced goods and
imports makes only a minor theoretical difference by introducing
another possible channel for undershooting. Empirically, however,
it is impossible to identify the weights in a two country model of
this type. For the estimation, we use the GNP deflator as the
price level. This incorporates the exchange rate and foreign price
level into the domestic price level through imports of intermediate
goods, but not through imports of consumer goods.
4 We have imposed the constraint that b3 =b4,which is necessary
because the real interest rate enters equation (3) in difference
form, on a6 but not on a5. If the constraint was applied
consistently, equation (3) would read,
(3') - = b3a3(et - - b3a4(r-r)
+c3t.
When the model was estimated with this constraint, it was clearly
rejected in favor of the model reported in the text. We felt that
the misspecification from the unsupported constraint was worse than
the inconsistency in the less constrained model.
29& Mussa (1981, 1982) argues that a superior formulation to Dornbush's
price equation would have the rate of inflation equal the expected
rate of change of the equilibrium price level, plus some proportion
(<1) of the difference between the equilibrium and the actual price
level. As emphasized both by Mussa and by Obstfeld andRogoff
(1983), Dornbusch's price equation is inappropriate either when
disturbances become anticipated long before they occur or when the
long run equilibrium of the economy moves over time. Neither
situation is considered in this paper.
6 Dornbusch's price level was a weighted average of domestic and
import price levels. This does not affect the results.
7 We use the term "risk aversion" in this section as a shorthand for
saying "either an increase in the level of risk aversion or in the
degree of exchange risk" repeatedly.
8 Serial correlation of the disturbances has only a minor effect on
the theoretical results. We incorporate serially correlated
disturbances in the empirical work.
9 Meese and Singleton (1980) use the variance of the first difference
of the exchange rate. This concept is similar to ours given the
different methods used to achieve stationarity. Frankel (1983) and
Frenkel and Mussa (1980) use the conditional variance around the
forward rate, while Flood (1981) uses the conditional variance
around the expected spot rate. These measures are appropriate if
it is desired to equate the concepts of risk and variability.
Since we do not wish to make normative statements about
variability, we have no need to equate these two concepts.
3010If 62 and are of opposite signs, ll, will decrease if
B10. It is possible that the decrease in outweights
the increases in B and to decrease s. This is
the only case where B1 =0does not minimize the asymptotic
variance. The conditional variance is always minimized when
B1 =0.
11We do not impose the cross error constraints between the v's and
the u's. Otherwise, there would be contemporaneous correlation
among the errors and the estimates would be inconsistent.
12The interest rates used for the estimation were representative
money market rates, taken from World Financial Markets. All other
data were taken from International Financial Statistics. The real
output, price level, and money supply data were seasonally
adjusted. The countries (and weights) used for constructing the
foreign variables were; Canada (.263), France (.131), Germany
(.168),Italy (.097), Japan (.275) and the United Kingdom (.066).
13We used the ARI procedure of TSP, which provides efficient
estimates of an equation whose disturbances display first order
serial correlation.
14We tested these conjectures by estimating all of the parameters of
the model by maximum likelihood. The major problem was that the
interest rate semi—elasticity of the demand for money was positive
for both time periods. Rehm (1983) was able to get plausible
maximum likelihood estimates for (in our notation) a1 and a2
for the United States by incorporating lags in the money demand
specification, an option precluded in this paper by the desire for
an analytic solution. Using maximum likelihood estimates of a1
31and a2 that appear to be clearly misspecified seemed to be a
worse choice than adopting the technique used in the paper.
15Since the parameters a1 and a2 enter the model only through the
definitions of and 62 in (10), and since 61 and 62 are
not constrained in this version, the values of a1 and a2 are
irrelevant. Thus the support for undershooting provided by
estimating the semi-constrained version is not contingent on the
questions involved in the estimation of the money demand
parameters.
16One disturbing aspect of the estimates is that
cii,
the serial
correlation coefficient in the exchange rate equation, is greater
than unity for 1973 (III) -1982(III). We experimented with both
a second order autoregressive and third order moving average
representation for u1, but the result did not change. We also
attempted to estimate the model using first -differenced, rather
than detrended, data but could not get the estimates to converge at
an optimum.
17The unconstrained log likelihood is 517.875 for 1973—79 and 679.176
for 1973—82. There are 17 parameters in the constrained version;
22 in the unconstrained version.
18Driskill and Sheffrin (1981) and Papell (1983a) use maximum
likelihood estimates and likelihood ratio tests. Glaessner (1982)
uses generalized method of moments estimates and chi-squared test.
32Table 1
Constrained Maximum Likelihood Estimates
1973 (II)—1979 (III) 1973 (I1)—1982 (III)
Asymptotic Asymptotic
Parameter Estimate "t ratio" Estimate "t ratio"
—.08 —.18 —.12 —1.51 a 1.59 2.97 .43 1.30
.09 1.13 .08 3.92 a .22 2.33 .18 263 a .56 .80 3.17 2.15
a, —.37 -1.68 .21 2.15 a 1.43 2.54 1.79 6.04
a,., -.94 —1.15 —1.14 -2.43
a' .09 .25 —.29 —3.25 a —1.19 —2.05 —.81 —1.91 a —.61 —.57 .19 .49
.81 5.77 1.04 16.26
.13 .73 .10 .53
.79 9.70 .35 3.19
.83 15.14 .83 12.76
.93 17.78 .76 9.28
.56 4.27 .26 2.14
SingleEquation Estimates
Estimates tStatistic Estimate t Statistic
a 1.13 3.32 .91 2.99
.69 1.65 .60 2.77















Correlation Between Actual and Estimated Values
e .84 .86
q .94 .93
m .92 .84
.90 .93
y_y* .78 .78
i_i* .83 .65
Log Likelihood
491.548 669.465
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